



Toward a Science of Consciousness

Tucson, Arizona, April 8–13 1996

A landmark conference sponsored by the University of Arizona

Can machines be conscious? ◆ Approaching the 'Hard Problem' ◆ States and stages of consciousness
The physics of free will ◆ The role of primary visual cortex in conscious vision ◆ Functions of consciousness
Quantum processes in the brain ◆ Neural correlates of consciousness ◆ Medicine and consciousness
The role of extrastriate visual cortex in conscious vision ◆ Communication and cognition ◆ Phenomenology
Cognitive models of consciousness ◆ Current directions in parapsychology ◆ Transpersonal psychology

Daniel Dennett Roger Penrose John Searle Danny Hillis Joseph Bogen Colin Blakemore V.S. Ramachandran J Alan Hobson Patricia Churchland Paul Churchland David Rumelhart Rodolfo Llinás Christof Koch Roger Tootell Nicos Logothetis Lawrence Weiskrantz Dimitri Nanopoulos Stuart Hameroff David Chalmers Alwyn Scott Francisco Varela Nicholas Franks Andrew Weil Susan Greenfield Michael Lockwood Irene Pepperberg Roger Shepard Petra Stoerig Robert Turner Dov Sagi Daniel Schacter Friedrich Beck Ned Block Jeffrey Gray Jaron Lanier Paul Bloom Diana Reiss Sue Savage-Rumbaugh Henry Stapp Charles Tart Roger Walsh Robert Forman Susan Blackmore Daryl Bem Roger Nelson Dick Bierman Avshalom Elitzur David Hodgson Max Velmans For registration information and full details contact the University of Arizona at the address below

Journal of Consciousness Studies

JCS is a refereed journal for the general reader, bringing together psychologists, neuroscientists, philosophers, computer scientists — in fact anyone seriously interest in consciousness studies. The current volume includes:

- a fiery exchange between Patricia Churchland and Roger Penrose on quantum theory, microtubules and mind.
- a special issue including David Chalmers' essay on the 'hard problem' of conscious experience, with replies from six authors. How could it be possible, asks Colin McGinn, for technicolor phenomenology to arise from the soggy grey matter of brains?
- a passionate attack by Jaron Lanier on software 'agents of alienation', while Donald Michie describes recent trends in artificial consciousness.
- Daniel Dennett, Owen Flanagan, Mary Midgley, John McCarthy, Selmer Bringsjord, David Hodgson, Charles Tart, Todd Moody and others in a symposium on the philosopher's 'zombie problem'.
- Past issues (all still available) include Francis Crick, Benjamin Libet, Ivan Illich, Stevan Harnad, Eleanor Rosch, John Beloff, Euan Squires, Friedrich Beck and many exciting new authors
- "There is no other journal quite like it, and one day we shall, I think, look back to its appearance as a defining moment . . . and at the price, it's a snip!"

 Jeffrey Gray, Nature
- You guys have a marvelous magazine . . . a very courageous magazine. You publish a lot of things that would not be published in routine philosophical and scientific journals, and that seems to me to be exactly right at our present state of the investigation of consciousness. We don't know how it works and we need to try all kinds of different ideas." John Searle Quarterly. Annual rates: \$25 (individuals), \$48 (libraries). ISSN 1355 8250.

Conscious Experience

A major collection of new essays (ed. Thomas Metzinger), which presents the state of the art in this emerging multidisciplinary field.

Conceptual Foundations: Peter Bieri: Why is consciousness puzzling? Robert van Gulick: What would count as explaining consciousness? Michael Tye: The Burning House. Sceptical Accounts: Kathy Wilkes: Losing consciousness. Martin Kurthen: On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. Georges Rey: Towards a projectivist account of conscious experience. Consciousness and the Physical World: Colin McGinn: Consciousness and space. Eva Ruhnau: Time gestalt and the observer. Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland: Gaps in Penrose's toiling. The Knowledge Argument: Martine Nida-Rümelin: What Mary couldn't know — belief about phenomenal states. William Lycan: A limited defence of phenomenal information. David Papineau: The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness. Qualia: Joseph Levine: Qualia: intrinsic, relational, or what? Diana Raffman: On the persistence of phenomenology. David Chalmers: Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. Consciousness and Higher-Order-States: Güven Güzeldere: Is consciousness the perception of what passes on one's own mind? David Rosenthal: Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. Norton Nelkin: The dissociation of phenomenal states from apperception. Information-processing and neurobiological approaches: Robert Kirk: How is consciousness possible? Ansgar Beckermann: Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. Thomas Metzinger: Faster than thought: holism, homogeneity and temporal coding. Artificial Consciousness: Daniel Dennett: Cog: steps towards consciousness in robots. Dieter Birnbacher: Artificial consciousness. Selected Bibliography: Consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and neuroscience 1970-1995 (1000 titles, 18 sections).

576 pages, \$28 (pbk.) 0907845053; \$45 (hbk.) 090784510X; inc. postage

To order, register or for free brochure phone 1-800-478-9604 Email jlaukes@ccit.arizona.edu Jim Laukes, University of Arizona Extended University, PO Box 210158, Tucson, AZ 85721-0158. Fax: 602- 621-3269