



FOR TURBOSUPERCHARGER

Vice President Wallace is shown here presenting the 1940 Collier Aviation Trophy to Dr. Sanford A. Moss, General Electric engineer, and to the U. S. Army Air Corps for the development of the turbosupercharger that makes possible airplane flying at very high altitudes. It is now part of the equipment of the Boeing Flying Fortress, Lockheed P-38, Republic Lancer and Thunderbolt and other high altitude planes. Major General Walter R. Weaver, acting chief of the Air Corps, represented the Air Corps.

PSYCHOLOGY

Fanatical Super-Patriotism May Impede Defeat of Japs

Would Prevent Any Real Opposition to Japan's War Efforts on Part of Most Liberal Elements There

JAPANESE fanatical super-patriotism may make them harder to defeat than might be anticipated from a mere count of their man power or battleships and airplanes.

This is the view of the psychologist Dr. Otto Klineberg, of Columbia University, specialist on racial differences and the relation between culture and psychology.

"Even the Chinese, with all the hatred and opposition which they felt toward the Japanese imperialists and their followers, still expressed their admiration of the unbounded love which the Japanese felt toward their own country," Dr. Klineberg said in reply to a query about the Japanese habits of mind. "I think, that this will mean that a very great many Japanese will be willing to sacrifice themselves in order to win a victory. This is obviously not an exclusively Japanese characteristic.

"In this respect, as in others, the differ-

ence is entirely one of degree, but I do feel that the Japanese have a sense of solidarity and identity with their country which is relatively rare in other national groups."

Dr. Klineberg discounts the idea, however, that the attack on Hawaii was one of "hara-kiri"—the suicidal act of desperate people committed in super-patriotic fervor. He sees in it nothing he regards as characteristically Japanese, any more than it is characteristically German or Italian.

"The sudden attack by the Japanese, and their continued all-out offensive at the present time, argues in favor of a definite plan to win, rather than to go down fighting," Dr. Klineberg said. "The attack in itself, treacherous as it was, seems to me not at all related to anything specific to the Japanese personality. It is of course cut after the same pattern as the customary Nazi procedure, and I am definitely inclined to ascribe it to Japan's

relation to the Axis rather than to any peculiar Japanese tradition. My own limited knowledge of Japanese history does not suggest to me that such a pattern of treacherous attack is any more typical of the Japanese than it is of many other peoples with a long tradition of warfare."

But in another respect, Dr. Klineberg believes that the Japanese overgrown sense of national honor may have had a part in the outbreak of hostilities. He said: "The Japanese have committed themselves to a policy of expansion in Asia; they had enunciated this policy on many occasions, and felt in many cases an idealistic attachment toward it. By this I mean that they had persuaded themselves that it was a moral obligation rather than just a program of imperialistic expansion.

"As so many people have pointed out, 'face' has the greatest significance for the Japanese. The loss of face which would have resulted from bowing to American requests for abandonment of the expansionist policy, was something that the Japanese people simply could not accept.

"Since they probably felt that war was inevitable as a consequence, they took a leaf out of the Nazi notebook and struck first without warning.

"Once again it is important to point out that 'face saving' is not a peculiarly Oriental phenomenon, and that we and other Western nations have it as well; there is again a difference of degree, however, and its importance is undoubtedly greater for the Japanese.

"I do not believe it possible that Nomura and Kurusu could have had knowledge of the Japanese attack when they went to see Mr. Hull. It may be that they knew the attack was coming some time, but I feel that they could not have known that it was already in progress.

"In the light of what is known of the relation between the Japanese government and the military leaders, it seems to me much more plausible that the Navy began its campaign without getting definite instructions from the Japanese government to proceed. Once it had happened, however, the Japanese, with the hypertrophied sense of national honor to which I have referred, would undoubtedly go to the support of the military leaders and present a unified national front.

"I think, too, that this will mean that the 'liberal' elements in Japan can not be counted upon for any real opposition to the Japanese war effort because for the most part (although there will be exceptions) their feeling of national identity will be stronger than their former political affiliations."

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